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Mothers and Independent Citizens: Making Sense 
of Wollstonecraft’s Supposed Essentialism 
Sandrine Berges 
Abstract: Mary Wollstonecraft argues that women must be independent citizens, but that 
they cannot be that unless they fulfill certain duties as mothers. This is problematic in a 
number of ways, as argued by Laura Brace in a 2000 article. However, I argue that if we 
understand Wollstonecraft’s concept of independence in a republican, rather than a liberal 
context, and at the same time pay close attention to her discussion of motherhood, a 
feminist reading of Wollstonecraft is not only possible but enriching. I will attempt to show, 
in particular, that the seeds of a feminist argument for co-parenting are to be found in the 
Vindication of the Rights of Woman. 
Introduction 
Mary Wollstonecraft, in her Vindication of the Rights of Woman,1 first 
published in 1792, proposed the following: women must become 
independent citizens on an equal footing with men but only if they fulfill 
certain duties when they are mothers. This has long posed a dilemma for 
readers of the Vindication. On the one hand, Wollstonecraft seems to 
make citizenship for women dependent on their fulfilling certain duties 
as mothers, thus closely tying their contribution to society to their 
biological functions. On the other hand, the requirement that women, as 
citizens, should be independent seems to buy in to a patriarchal ideology 
that fails to take into account the ties of care that women, when they are 
mothers, experience. Given this, it is not surprising that feminist 
scholars have often been tentative in embracing Wollstonecraft’s 
writings, or even discussing them at any length. One notable exception is 
Laura Brace, who, in her article on marriage in Wollstonecraft tackles 
                                                      
1 Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, A Vindication of the Rights of Men, 
An Historical and Moral View of the French Revolution (Oxford University Press, 1993). All 
page references in the text are to this edition. 
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260 Sandrine Berges 
both the issues mentioned above but concludes that Wollstonecraft, on 
the whole, fails to offer a solution that will reconcile independence and 
motherhood for all women. (2000: 453)2 Brace seems to suggest that 
although Wollstonecraft bravely attempts to build a position for women 
both as mothers and citizens, she fails on both counts because she is too 
steeped in patriarchalism on the one hand, and essentialism on the 
other. In this essay, I want to argue that there is more to be said on both 
aspects of the problem.  
I will begin, in Section Two, by examining the relevant part of the 
philosophical framework within which Wollstonecraft operates, namely 
her discussion of independence. Brace interprets Wollstonecraft’s notion 
of independence as ‘self-ownership’ thereby situating her within the 
liberal tradition. (2000: 433) I refrain from doing this and argue that her 
concept of independence is probably best understood within a 
republican tradition as non-domination. This reading of Wollstonecraft’s 
views on independence allows me to respond to a potential objection 
drawn from Iris Marion Young’s critique of the liberal notion of 
independence as applied to mothers.  
In Section Three, I will follow this discussion with an exposition of 
the problem of feminine essentialism in Wollstonecraft and some 
suggestions as to how one might understand it in the light of her view 
that women should be independent from men. I will argue, in particular, 
that while Wollstonecraft associates certain duties with motherhood, she 
does not claim that all women need be mothers, nor that those who are 
should be reduced to the demands of motherhood.  
Sections Four and Five will examine in more detail some of the 
arguments of A Vindication of the Rights of Woman that might appear 
particularly problematic in the light of this apparent conflict between 
essentialism and independence, namely women’s duty to breast-feed 
their children and the question of whether women should work outside 
                                                      
2 See Laura Brace ‘“Not Empire, but Equality”: Mary Wollstonecraft, the Marriage State 
and the Sexual Contract’, The Journal of Political Philosophy 8.4 (2000), pp. 433-455.  
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Mothers and Independent Citizens 261 
the home. I hope to show that what Wollstonecraft has to say on these 
topics is more compatible with her arguments for independence than 
her apparent essentialism might suggest.  
2. Independence and Citizenship 
Wollstonecraft’s plea for independence for women is complex: both 
internal and external. Dependent beings ‘act according to the will of 
another fallible being, and submit, right or wrong, to power.’ (1993: 115) 
To become independent, women ‘must only bow to the authority of 
reason, instead of being the modest slaves of opinion.’ (1993: 119. And 
she adds: ‘For it is the right use of reason alone which makes us 
independent of everything—excepting the unclouded Reason,—“Whose 
service is perfect freedom.”’ (1993: 197) Wollstonecraft is truly a child of 
the Enlightenment, or the Age of Reason as her colleague Thomas Paine 
called it. She sees the possibility of progress, both in human 
development and political arrangements, in the pursuit of reason.3,4 
Wollstonecraft’s understanding of independence is also external, 
practical even: to be independent means to be capable of earning one’s 
own living: ‘earn their own subsistence: the true definition of 
independence’ (1993: 158). For Wollstonecraft, a being who is financially 
                                                      
3 This is why she dedicates her Vindication of the Rights of Woman to Talleyrand, who had 
just published a pamphlet on educational reforms in republican France. If France’s pursuit 
of equality and democracy is going to succeed, she argues, then all its adult inhabitants 
must be taught to live according to reason, so women should not be excluded from the new 
educational system, cf. Sandrine Berges The Routledge Guidebook to Wollstonecraft’s A 
Vindication of the Rights of Woman (2013), pp. 19-25.  
4 Her belonging to that tradition can, of course, be held against her in the sense that some 
feminists believe that the enlightenment was a fundamentally patriarchal framework (see, 
for instance Genevieve Lloyd, The Man of Reason (Routledge, 1993), 2nd edition). But this 
attitude has been questioned. See Karen Green, The Woman of Reason (Continuum, 1995). 
More particularly, Eva Kittay, Love’s Labour (Routledge, 1999), p. 41 argued that ‘the 
Enlightenment vision leaves unchallenged women’s role as dependency workers. The 
public space, within liberal, political and economic theory, has largely remained the 
domain of free equal, rationally self-interested beings. Entering that space does not free 
the dependency worker from responsibilities to her charges.’ In this paper I challenge this 
view of the enlightenment insofar as Wollstonecraft is concerned and show that, for her, 
the space of free equals includes mothers.  
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262 Sandrine Berges 
dependent on another is not just a burden to herself but also not in a 
position to be of any use to society:  
But to render her really virtuous and useful she must not, if she discharges 
her civil duties, want individually the protection of civil laws, she must not be 
dependent on her husband’s bounty for her subsistence during his life, or 
support after his death—for how can a being be generous who has nothing of 
its own? (1993: 227) 
Even marriage, she says, is meaningless as an institution if women 
cannot earn their own money: ‘the intercourse of the sexes will never 
deserve the name of fellowship, men and women will never fulfill the 
peculiar duties of their sex, till they become enlightened citizens, till 
[women] become free by being enabled to earn their own subsistence, 
independent of men; in the same manner I mean, to prevent 
misconstruction, as one man is independent of another’ (1993: 250). 
And of course, as not all women must or can marry, single women too 
should achieve financial independence: 
And is not the government very defective […] that does not provide for 
honest independent women by encouraging them to fill respectable stations? 
But in order to render their private virtue a public benefit, they must have a 
civil existence in the state, married or single. (1993: 230)  
Although admirable in many respects, this external aspect of 
independence is also somewhat problematic because it links virtue and 
usefulness to the ability to earn a living. ‘Independence I have long 
considered as the grand blessing of life, the basis of every virtue—and 
independence I will ever secure by contracting my wants, though I were 
to leave on a barren heath’ (1993: 65). In this passage, Wollstonecraft 
appears as an early proponent of the claim that independence is 
necessary for the development of the virtues of citizenship.5 This is 
perfectly compatible with what she says elsewhere, namely that someone 
who lacks independence cannot be expected to think for themselves and 
if they do not think for themselves, they cannot become virtuous: ‘And 
                                                      
5 See W. Galston, ‘Liberal Virtues’, The American Political Science Review 82.4 (1988), pp. 
1277-1290.  
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Mothers and Independent Citizens 263 
that from the exercise of reason, knowledge and virtue naturally flow, is 
equally undeniable, if mankind be viewed collectively’. (1993: 76) The 
idea that independence is a requisite for virtuous citizenship has come 
under scrutiny from the late Iris Marion Young who proposed that at 
least in modern political thought, the norm of independence was ‘male 
biased and operative in relegating dependent people and their usually 
female caretakers to an inferior status.’ (1995: 536) Here she takes 
independence as meaning that one has a ‘well paid, secure job’ which 
allows one to support oneself and one’s children and to pay for them to 
receive the necessary education so that they in turn can have well-paid 
jobs. If parents achieve this, and also spend time and effort nurturing 
the seeds of virtues in their children, they might succeed in making good 
citizens out of them. But this requirement puts a lot of women in a 
double bind. They are, on the one hand, required to nurture 
independence in their children, to help them become good citizens, and 
on the other, they cannot do this and be financially independent—they 
need to rely on a man’s income to allow them to stay at home and 
educate their children. On this picture, citizenship means different 
things for men and women: for men, it requires independence, 
economic and otherwise, but for women, it requires only that they 
educate their sons to be independent, and their daughters to be 
nurturing of male independence.6  
It seems that Brace, who reads Wollstonecraft’s independence as self-
ownership and thereby ties her to a liberal tradition (2000: 433) has 
similar worries for Wollstonecraft’s conception: women, if they are 
mothers, will almost certainly fail to be independent in the way that men 
can be, so they are doomed not to achieve the full status of citizen, to 
remain socially and politically inferior. But if the concept of independence 
understood as self-ownership is a patriarchal one that does not take into 
                                                      
6 Iris Marion Young, ‘Mothers, Citizenship, and Independence: A Critique of Pure Family 
Values’, Ethics 105 (1995), pp. 535-556. Young is responding to Galston and his book 
Liberal Purposes (Cambridge University Press, 1991) in which he argues that single 
parenthood is bad for the economy.  
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264 Sandrine Berges 
account the particular life situations women tend to find themselves in 
(namely, motherhood and home making), then it is hardly surprising that 
women should not do well by its standards. I believe, though that Brace 
may be wrong in her interpretation of Wollstonecraft’s concept of 
independence. Historically speaking, Wollstonecraft is much more likely 
to have thought within a republican framework, not just because she was 
herself a political republican, but because the intellectual circles she 
moved in belonged to that tradition.7 Republican theory differs from 
liberalism in subtle but significant ways. Whereas the liberal concept of 
negative freedom is freedom from interference, Republicans think in 
terms of non-domination, or freedom from arbitrary powers.8 This has the 
following implications for the concept of independence. For a liberal, to 
be independent can mean self-ownership in the sense that I stand in 
relation to myself as a slave owner does to a slave, and I can do what I like 
to or with myself, and no-one has the right to stop me.9 From a liberal 
perspective, independence is also a matter of self-sufficiency, of an 
individual’s capacity to thrive without relying on outside help. This is of 
course problematic from the point of view of those who do depend on 
others because they are, for example, sick, and cannot look after 
themselves, but it is also problematic for those who care for them, and 
cannot, as a result of the time and effort they expand caring for others, 
also earn an income that is sufficient so that they do not need to rely on 
others to survive, let alone thrive. This is Young’s critique of the liberal 
concept of independence, and the context in which Brace situates 
Wollstonecraft’s debate.  
On the other hand, a republican concept of independence does not 
necessarily require complete self-reliance. Freedom from domination or 
                                                      
7 Alan Coffee in his ‘Mary Wollstonecraft, Freedom and the Enduring Power of Social 
Domination’, European Journal of Political Theory (2012), pp. 1-20, convincingly argues that 
Wollstonecraft’s concept of independence is best understood as non-domination.  
8 See Philip Pettit, Republicanism (Oxford University Press, 1997) and Quentin Skinner, 
Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
9 Gerry Cohen argues that this is in fact more of a libertarian than a liberal concept in his 
Self-ownership, Freedom and Equality (Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 69. 
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Mothers and Independent Citizens 265 
arbitrary power implies that one can be subject to a non-arbitrary power, 
one that is itself subject to reason and agreement. It is not incompatible 
with a person’s independence that they draw a salary from the state in 
order to enable them to look after a dependent. If there are laws that 
specify how and when the state will support carers, then someone who 
benefits from this support does not thereby sacrifice their independence. 
One issue with the republican theory is the question of whether we can 
and should tolerate interference. If the right focus is non-domination, 
rather than interference, does it mean that I can be independent and be 
interfered with? To some extent, interference is often caused by 
domination. Those who wield arbitrary power are more likely to 
interfere: it is what they do. On the other hand, it is perfectly possible 
for a non-arbitrary power to be very interfering because it has, for 
example, set out a large numbers of laws very clearly and precisely 
dealing with every aspect of our lives as a result of common 
deliberations. Though this is not the place to solve this problem, some 
light can be cast on the question by Wollstonecraft herself. In Chapter 
Two of the Vindication of the Rights of Woman she criticizes the tendency to 
treat women as if they were children in not allowing them to use their 
reason to make decisions about their own lives. She follows this 
immediately with thoughts on how children themselves ought to be 
treated. Her own experience as a teacher dictates the following mode of 
address towards her young charges: ‘your reason is now gaining 
strength, and till it arrives at some degree of maturity, you must look up 
to me for advice—then you ought to think, and only rely on God.’ (1993: 
85) Children are prime recipients of interference, as they are not mature 
enough to make decisions for themselves. But, Wollstonecraft insists, this 
interference must not take the form of arbitrary power over them: as 
their teacher, she embodies the reason that they do not yet have, and, 
she promises, she will abandon that role as soon as their reason, with her 
help, has matured. This model, in turn, can be applied to the case of an 
adult woman (or man) who find herself dependent on the state for her 
support. The state is financing her activities according to some pre-
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266 Sandrine Berges 
agreed rules, not according to any arbitrary power. If, by contrast, a 
woman is dependent on the good will of her husband to have enough 
money to bring up their children, she is subject to arbitrary power. In 
neither case is the woman independent in the sense of economic self-
sufficiency, but if she depends on the state, rather than her husband’s 
goodwill, there is a sense in which she is truly independent.  
It would strengthen my account to be able to offer evidence that 
Wollstonecraft sees the government’s role as providing women who are 
mothers and for whom it may be more difficult to develop financial 
independence with protection of some sort. Though she does not say 
anything of the kind in either Vindications, she comes very close to it in 
A View of the French Revolution when she says that: ‘Nature, having made 
men unequal, by giving stronger bodily and mental powers to one than 
to another, the end of government ought to be to destroy this inequality 
by protecting the weak.’ (1993: 289) If we believe that for a woman to 
agree to stay at home and raise children instead of working to earn her 
living is tantamount to putting herself in a situation of dependence on 
her husband, then such a government as Wollstonecraft describes in 
that passage would have to step in and redress the inequality born out 
of that situation, by either making it a matter of law that the father 
provide for his wife adequately or by giving women an income directly 
(although there is no evidence that the latter is what Wollstonecraft had 
in mind).10  
The corollary of demanding that a government should protect 
women from becoming subject to arbitrary power is that women should 
be considered citizens in their own rights. Wollstonecraft asserts that 
women ‘must have a civil existence in the state, married or not.’ (1993: 
                                                      
10 See Karen Green, The Woman of Reason (Continuum, 1995) for a discussion of how 
Wollstonecraft’s arguments offer the beginning of a solution to women’s disadvantage born 
out of their responsibilities as mothers, 98. Wollstonecraft denies that women are by nature 
weaker than men in any respect other than bodily strength. But if we understand her 
comment as a metaphor for economic inequality (and, after all, she did not believe that 
French aristocrats were stronger or cleverer than French peasants!), we can apply it to 
gender inequality.  
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [B
ilk
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
1:3
7 1
6 M
ay
 20
14
 
Mothers and Independent Citizens 267 
230) In particular, she strongly disapproves of the idea that a household 
or family should be regarded as a unit run by its senior male member, 
thereby foreshadowing Susan Moller Okin’s arguments in Justice, Gender 
and the Family (1989). ‘The laws respecting woman, which I mean to 
discuss in a future part, make an absurd unit of a man and his wife; and 
then by the easy transition of considering him as responsible, she is 
reduced to a mere cypher’. (1993: 226) This view of what a family ought 
not to be entails, amongst other things, that a wife should not, even if 
she is a mother, derive her independence from her husband: she must 
have her own. ‘But to render her really virtuous and useful she must not, 
if she discharge her civil duties, want, individually, the protection of civil 
laws; she must not be dependent on her husband’s bounty for her 
subsistence during his life, or support after his death—for how can a 
being be generous who has nothing of its own?’ (1993: 227) 
It also follows that we shouldn’t be misled by Wollstonecraft’s own 
desire for financial independence acquired outside marriage into 
thinking that she somehow looks down on women who are not striving 
towards the same goal. What she disapproves of are laws and practices 
which prevent women from being self-sufficient by giving their property 
and decision making power to their husbands. This need not entail the 
stronger claim that all women to whom that capacity is restored should 
strive to earn enough money to support themselves at all costs.  
3. Feminine Essentialism 
Even if Wollstonecraft’s proposal that independence be a prerequisite for 
developing virtues compatible with citizenship does not fall foul of 
Young’s objection, it remains worrying for a different reason. 
Wollstonecraft believes that men and women should be full citizens. She 
also believes that there is no such thing as ‘feminine virtue’—virtue, like 
reason, is genderless, and we should look for the same character 
development in women as in men.11 Yet, independence, which is supposed 
                                                      
11 The only difference she grants is in physical strength, but even this, as Adrianna Craciun 
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268 Sandrine Berges 
to nurture virtue, seems to have different consequences for men and 
women. Notably, an independent woman will be a better wife and mother: 
‘It is vain to expect virtue from women till they are in some degree 
independent of men; nay, it is vain to expect that strength of natural 
affection which would make them good wives and mothers.’ (1993: 221) 
This passage in Chapter Nine of the Vindication should not be read in 
isolation as Wollstonecraft also takes care to extol the virtues of 
fatherhood, and makes it very clear that women cannot become better 
mothers ‘till men become attentive to the duty of a father’. (1993: 68) 
However, it seems as if the duties of motherhood are going to be, in 
Wollstonecraft’s picture, rather heavier than the duties of fatherhood. A 
father is expected to go to work from morning till evening to support his 
family (1993: 223) and he should refrain from visiting prostitutes, because 
that would endanger his family’s health and financial security. (1993: 68) 
A mother should do somewhat more: ‘The wife, in the present state of 
things, who is faithful to her husband, and neither suckles nor educates 
her children, scarcely deserves the name of a wife and has no right to that 
of a citizen.’ (1993: 227) This is not an isolated point. Just a few 
paragraphs before she tells us that ‘speaking of woman at large, their first 
duty is to themselves as rational creatures, and the next, in point of 
importance, as citizens, is that which includes so many, of a mother.’ 
(1993: 226). It is worth noting that both these passages are qualified, the 
first by ‘in the present state of things’ and the second by ‘speaking of 
woman at large’. Certainly, Wollstonecraft is not making any universal 
claim here, and she could easily be read as commenting on the situation of 
her contemporaries, rather than trying to define womanhood in general. I 
will come back to this point later in this section. 
In the next chapter Wollstonecraft reinforces her argument by 
                                                                                                                       
(Mary Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Woman: A Sourcebook [Routledge, 2002], p. 83) 
points out, is always qualified in terms of appearance. It is almost as though Wollstonecraft is 
keeping her fingers crossed behind her back while telling men they don’t have to worry 
because they are still superior in some way. See also Sandrine Berges, The Guidebook to 
Wollstonecraft's A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (Routledge, 2013), pp. 63-66. 
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Mothers and Independent Citizens 269 
claiming that ‘the care of children in their infancy is one of the grand 
duties annexed to the female character by nature’. (1993: 233) She 
reiterates this thought in Chapter Thirteen when she says that ‘the 
rearing of children […] has justly been insisted on as the peculiar 
destination of woman’. (1993: 278) This, it seems, goes back on her 
earlier and often repeated claim that there were no moral differences 
between men and women, merely physical ones. Of course, nature has 
made it physically impossible for men to breastfeed infants: but why turn 
this into a matter of character and duty? Some of the claims 
Wollstonecraft makes here suggest that she might adhere to a form of 
feminine essentialism, i.e., that she might believe that there is something 
fundamental in women’s nature that makes them different from men. 
For Wollstonecraft, the essence of human nature is reason and the 
capacity to become virtuous. So to be a successful human being one 
needs to use reason to acquire knowledge and virtue. And although 
Wollstonecraft may seem to believe that there is a female essence over 
and above this human essence, she is adamant that it is neither reason 
nor the capacity for virtue, which both belong to human nature and are 
genderless. Instead she claims it is linked to women’s physical nature: 
women are physically equipped to give birth to children and to breast-
feed infants, and from this, Wollstonecraft deduces that they have a 
naturally derived duty to do so. That she does not argue for this position 
may indicate that she has not spent a great deal of time analyzing it or 
attempting to justify it. Rather, it may have struck her as obvious that as 
women could not help giving birth to babies once they were married, 
they had a duty to look after them.12  
How can Wollstonecraft maintain both that the only differences 
                                                      
12 One thought which probably would not have occurred to Wollstonecraft, but is helpful 
here, is that a distinction can and should be made between birthing and mothering. Only 
women can give birth, but men and women can provide the sort of care that babies and 
young children need. So the duties of mothers do not derive from their biological capacity 
to produce babies, but from their taking on the responsibility to look after them. See Sara 
Ruddick, Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace (Beacon Press, 1989), pp. 50-51 for 
this argument.  
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270 Sandrine Berges 
between men and women are those of bodily strength and yet, that in 
order to be virtuous and good citizens women must perform duties that 
men do not? Three possible explanations come to mind. First, she may 
be exercising caution in some of her claims so as not to scare off her 
audience. She is almost certainly weighing her words so as to maximize 
her chances of her very radical views being heard. By reassuring men 
that women will still be good wives and mothers if they are educated and 
granted equal citizen rights, she is making potential allies of them. A 
second possible explanation is to be found in Chapter Three of the 
Vindication, in which Wollstonecraft defends the view that men and 
women must share the same virtues i.e., that there is no such thing as a 
feminine virtue. Here is what she says there: ‘Women, I allow, may have 
different duties to fulfill; but they are human duties, and the principle 
that should regulate the discharge of them, I sturdily maintain, must be 
the same.’ (1993: 119) 
But what, we ask, are human duties? One suggestion is that they be 
contrasted to what she has called elsewhere grand duties i.e., duties that 
concern our being worthy of the afterlife, divine duties, as it were. 
Human duties, by contrast, are what one needs to fulfill in order to be a 
good citizen, in order to make the best one can of this life. This does fit 
in with the quote at (1993: 226), namely that women’s first duty is to live 
as rational beings, and then to be good mothers in order to be good 
citizens. It does not fit, however, with Wollstonecraft using the terms 
‘grand duty’ to refer to the mothering of infants at (1993: 233).13  
For a third and more satisfying explanation of this perceived 
essentialism, we must turn again to the passages in which Wollstonecraft 
strongly qualifies claims about the role or nature of women. ‘In the 
present state of things’ she says, a woman must be a good wife and 
mother in order to earn the title of citizen (1993: 227), suggesting that it 
is a matter of contingency rather than necessity. And it is ‘woman at 
                                                      
13 Brace thinks that the duties of motherhood are characterized as grand duties because 
they are natural duties (448). That yet another interpretation is possible shows how loosely 
Wollstonecraft was using the expressions ‘grand end’ or ‘grand duty’. 
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Mothers and Independent Citizens 271 
large’ who finds herself landed with the duties of motherhood (1993: 
226), again, with an emphasis on the non-absoluteness of the situation. 
Wollstonecraft’s view of motherhood can, therefore, plausibly be read as 
contingent on what is possible for women in late eighteenth-century 
England, in which there indeed seems to be very few options available 
for women to lead a good life which does not involve being primary 
carers of children.14 But there is, even in these passages, a very strong 
suggestion that there might be a different state of things, in which 
‘woman at large’ and not just exceptional individuals, could be citizens 
without being first mothers. She already does consider that this should 
be the case for her contemporaries when she remarks that some women 
will not marry, by choice or necessity, and that the government has a 
duty to enable them to live useful lives outside of marriage by making it 
possible for them to enter interesting and challenging professions. 
(1993: 230)15 We are unfortunately at a loss when it comes to outlining 
much of Wollstonecraft’s positive proposal for a gender-balanced state. 
This is because although she intended to write a second volume to her 
Vindication of the Rights of Woman, she never did. She does, however, hint 
strongly that the second volume was meant to discuss such a positive 
proposal, stating that it would deal with ‘the laws respecting woman’. 
(1993: 226)16 
                                                      
14 This brings to mind the view held by Ruddick (1989: 41), that ‘in most cultures the 
womanly and the maternal are conceptually and politically linked’ and that we cannot ‘at 
will transcend’ this division of labour, because it has ‘shaped our minds and lives’. It is 
certainly the case in Wollstonecraft’s culture that women do the work of raising children, 
and, especially given the inevitable confusion of birthing and mothering, Wollstonecraft 
was not in a position to transcend this prejudice.  
15 Of course not being married does not mean that one will not become a mother: indeed 
Wollstonecraft herself was a single mother to her first daughter. But here we should 
probably read her as suggesting that those women who chose to remain unmarried will also 
remain childless. I owe this point to Gökcenur Hazinedar.  
16 Wollstonecraft announces in her advertisement that there will be a second volume. That 
she did not write it is not terribly surprising as she died a mere five years after the 
publication of the first volume and that in between she spent time in Paris, writing about 
the revolution, traveled to Scandinavia, to investigate a stolen ship, had two daughters, and 
twice attempted suicide. She did leave some notes which Godwin published after her death 
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272 Sandrine Berges 
This third reading of the apparent essentialism in Wollstonecraft’s 
writing makes it less problematic in view of her insistence that women 
must be independent: in the context of the eighteenth century, 
independence has to go via motherhood.17 So let us now turn to the 
particulars of what Wollstonecraft expects of mothers. By looking further 
into what the burdens Wollstonecraft lays on women are, we might in 
particular consider whether some of them might have struck her as a 
necessary have revised her views if she had known what motherhood 
could mean in the twenty-first century? 
4. The Duty to Suckle 
The duty of a mother, Wollstonecraft says, ‘includes so many’. The first 
one according to her must be to suckle one’s babies. In the Vindication 
she goes so far as to argue that mothers must breastfeed in order to 
preserve their children from vice: ‘Her parental affection, indeed, can 
scarcely deserve the name, when it does not lead her to suckle her 
children, because the discharge of this duty is equally calculated to 
inspire maternal and filial affection: and it is the indispensable duty of 
men and women to fulfil the duties which give birth to affections that are 
the surest preservative against vice. Natural affection, as it is termed, I 
believe to be a very faint tie, affections must grow out of the habitual 
exercise of a mutual sympathy; and what sympathy does a mother 
exercise who sends her babe to a nurse, and only takes it from a nurse to 
send to school?’ (1993: 234) Receiving real affection from one’s parents 
is a good way of not becoming vicious, she says. Presumably she believes 
                                                                                                                       
under the title Hints (chiefly designed to have been incorporated in the second half of the 
Vindication of the Rights of Woman). But these are to scant to give much of an idea of what 
she might have written. These can be read in Todd and Butler, The Works of Mary 
Wollstonecraft (Pickering and Chatto, 1989), Volume 5. 
17 Again I disagree with Brace’s interpretation. She sees Wollstonecraft’s attempts at 
reconciling independence with motherhood as evidence that she is ‘trapped by liberal 
assumptions and traditions’ (2000: 446) whereas I believe that she is trying to integrate 
independence into the actual life conditions of her contemporaries, with the proviso that she 
hopes these conditions will change, and that she is making an effort to help them change. 
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Mothers and Independent Citizens 273 
that someone who is loved as a child will not be desperately seeking 
pleasure as an adult—and failing to find it—in vicious practices. This 
makes a certain amount of sense. But what is more difficult to accept is 
her linking of women feeding their infants to the giving of affection. 
This makes more sense in context. It would have been fairly common in 
the eighteenth century for a well-off mother to send her babies to live 
with a wet-nurse, not to see them till they were three, and then spend 
very little time with them, preferring to leave them to the care of 
servants until they were old enough—particularly if they were boys—to 
be sent to school. So not feeding one’s babies, in many cases, would 
amount to refusing to give them affection. Mothers, if they cared, would 
make the mistake of relying on the natural bond between them and their 
child and be surprised, eighteen years later, to find themselves facing a 
polite but cold stranger. So Wollstonecraft is probably not attacking 
women who do not breastfeed as such. In particular, she might well have 
been understanding of women who, for one reason or another, end up 
feeding their babies from bottles.  
One interesting aspect of Wollstonecraft’s view is that it is also 
teleological: she thinks women are designed to fare better if they are 
good mothers. For instance, breastfeeding means that women will be 
healthier and have less crowded families, because they are not fertile 
whilst they are breastfeeding and therefore cannot become pregnant 
again as soon as they have given birth.18 This is roughly right, but there 
are exceptions and reservations. Breastfeeding is not the healthiest 
option for all women. It can in fact be extremely painful and lead to 
                                                      
18 Brace reads rather more than I do in Wollstonecraft’s claim that breast-feeding is 
advantageous to women, as she claims that it can ‘help women to escape from the traps set 
for them by patriarchy. It releases them from being caught in the present; it provides them 
with an active rationality which is neither “brutish” nor masculine, and it allows them to 
find a course between slavery and tyranny. Maternal solicitude can make women whole by 
uniting reason and affection, bringing together her person and her body. It also gives 
women a place in the world, the potential to be recognized by others as a self-conscious 
being’. (2000: 450) It is not surprising then, that Brace finds Wollstonecraft’s solution to 
paternalism not entirely satisfying (2000: 453). 
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274 Sandrine Berges 
children not feeding enough if they don’t latch on properly. And while 
feeding a child for two years may ensure a space of nearly three years 
between each birth, this may also place a burden on a woman’s health, 
cause her, at the very least to have back ache, which will worsen with 
every child and make her household and childcare work more difficult 
and painful. Unfortunately Wollstonecraft’s ideal of the healthy, 
muscular woman cannot be realized for everyone: not all women have 
the same natural propensity towards health and strength, and some will 
suffer from giving birth and suckling their infants, no matter what 
Wollstonecraft tells us. She is also highly critical of aristocratic women’s 
habits, such as drinking, and the diseases they have contracted through 
libertinage, which makes them incapable of producing healthy milk for 
their children. But what would she say of women who are taking 
medications which prevent them from breastfeeding? Would her faith in 
nature’s designs be shaken by this? It is hard to tell, but one might 
surmise that she might be willing to revise some of her views, at least as 
far as allowing exceptions is concerned.  
Wollstonecraft’s very demanding claims about parenting are worrying 
enough, however, there is worse: Wollstonecraft does not trust nature to 
enforce its own rules, but believes that society should ensure that 
nature’s dictates are observed: ‘I mean therefore to infer that the society 
is not properly organized which does not compel men and women to 
discharge their respective duties, by making it the only way to acquire 
that countenance from their fellow-creatures, which every human being 
wishes some way to attain.’ (1993: 222) She appears to believe that 
society should be so organized that a woman who chooses not to 
breastfeed her babies herself should be shunned by others. It is not 
entirely clear that she believes that this should be legislated for, but 
given her reference to the proper organization of society, it is likely that 
she meant this. This way of thinking is obviously problematic from a 
feminist perspective in that it puts women at a disadvantage by forcing 
them to use their bodies for the welfare of others for an extended period 
of time after each birth—as long as two years. Women of Wollstonecraft’s 
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Mothers and Independent Citizens 275 
time could not choose not to get pregnant if they were married as 
contraception was neither reliable, nor very much used. Wollstonecraft 
suggests that by breast-feeding infants they could make the intervals 
between pregnancies longer, but that means replacing one physically 
demanding job with another. In other words, Wollstonecraft is 
demanding of women that they perform a physically demanding job of 
the kind that their husband will never have to do whether they choose to 
or not.  
Wollstonecraft is not the only philosopher to believe that women 
should be forced to breast-feed. Aristotle, in Book VII of the Politics 19 
states that the lifestyle of pregnant women (diet and exercise) as well as 
the rearing of infants should be legislated for. (1335b14-1336a1) More 
recently, philosophers have debated whether women should be obliged 
by law to breastfeed their children, contrasting women’s rights to choose 
how they use their body to the rights of infants to receive benefits of 
breast milk.20 In some countries, this is actually legislated for, as for 
example in Indonesia, where women who do not breastfeed their 
children up to the age of six months face a fine of seven thousand 
pounds. It is clear that Wollstonecraft’s thoughts on this would not be 
rejected by all.  
One reason why women nowadays might reject the claim that they 
have a duty to breastfeed their children is that this would be 
incompatible with their career. Of course, women do have alternatives to 
                                                      
19 Aristotle’s Politics might well have been an inspiration for some of Wollstonecraft’s views. 
Natalie F. Taylor, in her excellent discussion of Aristotelianism and Lockeanism in 
Wollstonecraft cites evidence that Wollstonecraft was familiar with at least some of the 
Politics. She points out that in her Vindication of the Rights of Men, Wollstonecraft challenges 
Burke by suggesting, rightly, that he is quoting a misleading extract from the Politics, where 
Aristotle says that a democracy has points in common with a tyranny. N.F. Taylor, The 
Rights of Woman as Chimera (Routledge, 2007), p. 8. This passage makes it plausible either 
that Wollstonecraft had access to the 1598 translation of the Politics, or that she had taken 
part in some extensive discussions of this text with her more learned friends. This would 
not have made her an expert on Aristotle, but certainly she would have been conversant 
with his arguments. 
20 For instance, see Roache’s 2010 discussion ‘Is it criminal not to breast-feed?’ 
http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2010/08/is-it-criminal-not-to-breastfeed/ 
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276 Sandrine Berges 
breastfeeding which do not involve sending their children away to live 
with a wet-nurse for two years. We can feed children formula milk, 
specially designed to meet infants’ nutritional requirements, or we can 
express our milk (provided our employers allow us sufficient time, 
comfort and privacy to do so) so that that others can bottle feed our 
children. These options simply did not exist in the eighteenth century.21  
If there was no possibility of equalizing parenting by sharing the 
feeding of infants, there were, however, other tasks for fathers to 
perform in return for mothers breastfeeding infants. Wollstonecraft 
suggested that men had a duty to work in order to support their family. 
(1993: 223) However, the offer of financial support in exchange for 
raising children is often perceived as unsatisfactory for a number of 
reasons. First, women may prefer to earn a living and be part of the 
professional world than stay at home with children. Secondly, the 
spending power often belongs by default to the person who earns it, and 
so does consequently the decision making power. This means that being 
supported by one’s husband is not truly a financial compensation. 
Thirdly, those who don’t work outside the home typically don’t take part 
in politics, and are under-represented. Fourth, men do actually miss out 
on not being part of their children’s lives as they grow and develop if 
they are never at home during the day time.  
The second and third worry seem to be taken care of if I am right 
that Wollstonecraft believes that the government should ensure that 
women who stay at home to raise children should receive some sort of 
protection—depending, of course, on what form that protections takes 
in practice. Also relevant is her statement ‘that women ought to have 
representatives, instead of being arbitrarily governed without having any 
direct share allowed them in the deliberations of government.’ (1993: 
228) This means that women are instrumental in choosing the ways in 
which they are protected as carers.  
                                                      
21 The extraction of breast-milk through mechanical pumps or by hand became a 
recognized practice for the feeding of infants in the mid-nineteenth century: (J. Lepore, 
‘Baby Food’, The New Yorker, January 19 2009).  
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Mothers and Independent Citizens 277 
5. Working mothers 
In this section, I want to show how in the story she tells, women would not 
miss out on a richer life by staying at home to care for children, but that 
on the contrary, such a life would afford them valuable opportunities of 
the kind that their working husbands could only dream of.  
Wollstonecraft by no means limits her discussion of women’s place in 
society to the roles of being a wife and a mother. In fact, she suggests 
very strongly that for a woman who does not need to do all the work in 
her home herself, a woman who can afford servants, it is not enough that 
she should be a wife and a mother. Society ought to afford her more 
opportunities to make herself useful. Women, she says  
might certainly study the art of healing, and be physicians as well as nurses. 
And midwifery, decency seems to allot to them, though I am afraid the word 
midwife, in our dictionaries, will soon give place to accoucheur. (1993: 229) 
So not only are there insufficient professions open to women, but some 
are to be taken from them—midwives’ jobs, she predicts, will go to men, 
men with a fancy French appellation, which no doubt makes them seem 
more professional, hence more trustworthy.22 This is particularly 
interesting in the light of the recent movement towards having only 
midwives present at birth, or in some cases, doulas, trained birth-
partners. Replacing midwives by male doctors does not just take a 
profession away from women, it also puts men in control of yet another 
aspect of women’s lives. No wonder Wollstonecraft is displeased.  
She continues to suggest that women ‘might, also, study politics’, that 
they could be put in charge of ‘businesses of various kinds’. All these 
choices would be better, she says than what is currently available, namely 
marrying for the sake of financial support, prostitution (which is a 
version of the same), or joining the thousands of women ruining their 
                                                      
22 In fact from the 1720s it had become a fairly common practice in at least some parts 
of England to call a ‘man-midwife’ in case of emergencies or difficult births, and by the 
1770s man-midwives also commonly attended normal births. See Adrian Wilson, The 
Making of Man-midwifery: Childbirth in England, 1660-1770 (Harvard University Press, 
1995), pp. 164-165. 
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278 Sandrine Berges 
eyesights sewing for a living, or again, Wollstonecraft’s own bugbear, 
choosing a profession that offers very few rewards of any kind, i.e., that 
of a governess. 
She is very clear that a woman must have a place in society, whether 
or not she is married, and that no one should have to marry if they do 
not want to. (1993: 250)23 Although she may feel that a mother who does 
not take care of her children does not deserve the title of citizen, she 
does not believe that all women have a duty to become mothers. One 
wonders what she would have thought had she known it would one day 
be the case that fathers could look after babies while mothers went to 
work. It seems she would have applauded that for she clearly does not 
believe that women’s nature predisposes them solely for motherhood:  
How many women thus waste their life away the prey of discontent, who 
might have practised as physicians, regulated a farm, managed a shop, and 
stood erect, supported by their own industry, instead of hanging their heads 
surcharged with the dew of sensibility, that consumes the beauty to which it at 
first gave lustre. (1993: 230)  
Whatever Wollstonecraft believes about the duties of a mother, she 
clearly does not think that woman’s nature stops at motherhood, and she 
strongly believes in women having a set of real alternatives to marriage. 
This is consistent with her claim that woman’s first duty is to herself as a 
rational being.  
But despite this and her emphasis on the need for financial 
independence for women, and the idea that more professions should be 
open to them, the question of how much responsibility towards childcare 
should fall to the working mother is one that Wollstonecraft considers 
very little. In fact, she does not discuss in this respect the plight of 
working-class mothers, as we saw, and has very little to say that would be 
useful for the modern working mother. One thing she does suggest, 
                                                      
23 Here again I disagree with Brace who claims that Wollstonecraft ‘sees the sexual 
contract as a universal problem for all women, regardless of race or class, which means that 
she imposes a single solution on all women’ (2000: 454). That she several times includes a 
proviso such as ‘in the current state of things’ and ‘most women’ and that she specifies that 
marriage is not desirable for all women clearly shows that this is not the case.  
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Mothers and Independent Citizens 279 
though is that mothers may have the opportunity to engage in 
intellectually rewarding activities if they go about their duty well: ‘And 
did they pursue a plan of conduct, and not waste their times in following 
the fashionable vagaries of dress, the management of their household 
and children need not shut them out from literature, nor prevent their 
attaching themselves to a science, with that steady eye which strengthens 
the mind, or practicing one of the fine arts that cultivate the taste.’ 
(1993: 280) In other words, whether or not mothers can work, they can 
become writers, scientists and artists. This presents a stark contrast to 
what was commonly regarded as suitable for a married woman i.e., the 
exercise of accomplishments such as amateur drawing, painting and 
music. Women were expected to dabble in the arts, but not to become 
proficient. What Wollstonecraft is suggesting here is quite different and 
is an interesting consequence of the requirement that women should be 
free and educated, but responsible for children and household. Once the 
children are old enough to go to school, a woman who has some help 
with housework will have more free time than her husband who has to go 
out to work. She will, given her education, be able to use that time to 
conduct research just as an educated man of leisure might. In 
Wollstonecraft’s world, the scientists, the artists and the writers will be 
women more often than men who in this picture, have to work in order 
to earn a living. Nor is this simply idle speculation: when a few years 
after writing the Vindication, she became a mother herself, Wollstonecraft 
carried on pursuing her career as a writer, producing an account of the 
French revolution written according to research she conducted while 
residing in Paris during the Terror while pregnant with her first child. 
Her Letters from Sweden and Norway, published in 1796, were written 
during a trip she undertook to these countries on an expedition to 
investigate the loss of her lover’s ship, accompanied by her then toddler 
and a nanny.24 Wollstonecraft is quite right to insist that being a mother 
does not necessarily preclude producing work of distinction. 
                                                      
24 The letters can be read in Volume 6 of Todd and Butler (1989). 
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280 Sandrine Berges 
But what Wollstonecraft does not take into account, is that some 
working mothers will have much less flexible lives, and no time for 
reading, let alone writing, because they will still be responsible for their 
household and childcare. Her picture of the savant mother belongs 
squarely to the middle and upper classes. An Eighteenth Century 
working class mother who has to earn a living will never find the time for 
artistic, literary or scientific pursuits. And indeed, as Wollstonecraft 
herself informs us (1993: 253), these women’s formal education will have 
stopped at the age of nine, so they would be in no way prepared for such 
pursuits, even if they had the time for them. This exclusion is somewhat 
surprising as Wollstonecraft seems very aware, throughout the book of 
the plight of the working women, and tends to praise them in 
comparison to middle class women who could claim their freedom but 
choose to remain in their gilded cages. She in fact knew from experience 
that working-class women had no time to devote to anything other than 
their work and family, having lived with the family of her friend Frances 
Blood, and observed how her friend’s mother and herself worked from 
dawn till well into the night, sewing and embroidering, just to make ends 
meet, and received no help financially or otherwise from the father who 
could not keep a job, and did not regard it as his responsibility, as a 
man, to do household work. Wollstonecraft could not have expected 
women like this to become artists, writers or scientists.25  
That Wollstonecraft does not consider in this discussion that 
motherhood means something very different for middle-class, 
aristocratic women on the one hand, and lower class women on the 
other, means that she also probably cannot provide a great insight on 
the condition of working mothers nowadays.26 Twenty-first century 
women who have received a higher education tend not to decide to stay 
                                                      
25 And yet, her friend Frances Blood was an artist, and made part of her living by selling 
botanical drawings. But this was hand to mouth living, and she did not have the leisure to 
experiment with her art, working only on what she sold. 
26 Brace (2000: 435): ‘She also fails to recognize that the tensions between motherhood 
and citizenship affect middle-class and working-class women in different ways.’ 
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Mothers and Independent Citizens 281 
at home and look after their children while at the same time exercising 
their higher faculties by becoming artists, writers or scientists. Some do, 
of course, but in general, neither women nor men feel that their 
intellectual lives will be best fulfilled by becoming a scientist in their 
spare times. This is an eighteenth century ideal that no longer operates. 
Scientists work in labs, not homes. Science is a profession, not a hobby. 
And although art and literature are more likely to be perceived as 
hobbies, the production of artistically valuable works is seen as a full time 
occupation.27  
The way in which a lot of people do try and fulfill their intellectual 
lives is through their professional lives: people who have studied tend to 
want interesting jobs, which will engage them intellectually, force them 
to use the skills they have acquired and develop new ones, present a 
challenge. It is often a complaint of mothers who end up staying at home 
to look after children that they do not find their lives challenging 
enough, that although they are sometimes hard, they are not interesting, 
consisting mostly of changing nappies, going to doctors’ appointments, 
etc. Of course some women find that raising a child presents interesting 
challenges in itself. That was certainly the case for Wollstonecraft who 
drew on her experiences with her first born to write a manual of child 
rearing.28 But Wollstonecraft was always fascinated with education—not 
everybody is, and many women may fail to be stimulated by a baby’s 
daily progress. These women will probably long to go back to work, to an 
                                                      
27 There are of course exceptions: best-selling writer Stephenie Meyer claims the idea for 
the Twilight book series came to her in a dream, and that she worked out the plot ‘between 
swimming lessons and potty training’, writing it out late at night when everyone was asleep. 
But she herself probably would not describe her works as great literature. And she would 
certainly not claim that this is a reliable way of producing works of art. Her example is 
perhaps one of how inspiration can strike in the most unlikely circumstances and how 
determination can overcome the greatest obstacles. As far as scientific pursuits are 
concerned, the cases that match most closely what Wollstonecraft may have had in mind is 
that of software developers, who write code in their spare time. But it is quite clear that 
nobody in their right mind would choose motherhood as a way into literature, art or 
science.  
28 Lessons (1798) in Volume 4 of Todd and Butler (1989). 
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282 Sandrine Berges 
environment in which they can make use of the skills and abilities they 
have developed throughout their studies and early career. These women 
may, if they are lucky, find the fulfillment they seek by going back to 
work. But for many of them, no longer being able to look after their 
baby will cause them to feel guilty, even if only because this is what 
society is expecting them to feel.  
Some women choose to go back to work, but, increasingly, many 
women, from middle-class as well as working-class background, have no 
such choice: they have to go back to work in order to earn enough 
money to support their family. And this work is not always rewarding, so 
the fact that Wollstonecraft is ignoring the plight of the working mothers 
when she considers how fulfilling an educated mother’s life may be, is 
even more problematic as far as we are concerned. A large number of 
working mothers are not fulfilled, and have, somehow, to find the time 
and energy to care for their children, and look after the house. Part of 
the answer to this problem is, of course, that fathers need to take equal 
responsibility for household and childcare duty, and that we need to 
move away from Wollstonecraft’s attribution of these duties to women. 
There is nothing natural about a couple coming home from a day’s 
work, the man sitting down to read the paper while the woman cleans 
the house, puts the children to bed and prepares dinner—not unless we 
are prepared to think that women have vastly superior bodily strength 
than men i.e., deny the one superiority Wollstonecraft grants men have, 
and reverse it. But there is no other way of explaining the attitude that, 
after a day’s work, men need to rest, but women must carry on working.  
6. Conclusion: Equal parenting 
The conclusion which I wish to draw, is obvious; make women rational 
creatures, and free citizens, and they will quickly become good wives and 
mothers; that is—if men do not neglect the duties of husbands and fathers. 
(1993: 265) 
Despite the fact that Wollstonecraft expects so much more from mothers 
than she does from fathers, it is fair to say, I think, that she was of the 
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Mothers and Independent Citizens 283 
opinion that effective parenting had to be co-parenting. Men and 
women come together as parents, she says. This is where true marital 
affection is formed, in the joint love, and concern parents feel for their 
off-springs. There is no better illustration of what Wollstonecraft had in 
mind than the text she wrote for her own daughter, in which she 
describes the interaction of a child with her parents. This text, published 
by Godwin under the title ‘Lessons’ in 1798 was either written as a legacy 
for her first daughter before one of her suicide attempts, or when she 
was pregnant with her second daughter. Either way, she did not have 
time to finish it. The lessons consist first of words to learn and simple 
acts of hygiene and social interactions. Later, they place great emphasis 
on the development of reasoning skills. But they also always reflect 
Wollstonecraft’s idea of what a family should be like, one in which the 
parents love, respect, and help one another. When the mother is 
working, or has a headache, the child is taught to seek her father, and to 
ask him, quietly, to play ball in the garden. When the father is sick, or 
asleep—Godwin suffered from narcolepsia—the child comes with her 
mother to bring him chamomile tea, or tiptoes and whispers so as not to 
wake him. What Wollstonecraft describes here seems like a very modern 
relationship, in which parents are equally concerned about the 
development and well-being of their child, as well as each other’s well-
being.  
One must not forget, also that in the Wollstonecraft/Godwin family, 
both parents were professionals, each bringing a much needed income 
for the family’s expenses. Their respect of each other’s working life was 
marked by their keeping separate homes even after they were married, 
so they would each be able to go about their own work without having to 
make accommodations for the other (although of course, Wollstonecraft 
had her daughter with her and Godwin hence, had more freedom). Such 
arrangements were highly unusual for their time, and Wollstonecraft was 
right to state that ‘women in the common walks of life are called upon to 
fulfill the duties of wives and mothers’ and that only ‘women of a 
superior cast’ would want to pursue ‘more extensive plans of usefulness 
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and independence.’ (1993: 228) So her picture of what a common 
marriage should be like—the wife at home nursing her children, 
keeping her house neat with the help of just one servant, greeting her 
husband when he comes home weary after a hard day’s work (1993: 
223)—has little in common with the picture we have of her own 
marriage. But it is significant that her discussions of what a marriage 
should be like, what men and women should be brought to seek and 
expect, and what governments should support, can be accommodated to 
fit in both with the ‘common’ marriage, and the union of ‘superior 
women’ such as herself. That most women will choose to be only wives 
and mothers is not a natural necessity according to Wollstonecraft—but 
it is the most likely outcome for most of her middle-class 
contemporaries. It follows that much of what she says that a feminist 
nowadays might find objectionable is simply the result of an effort to 
instill progress in her contemporaries’ social and political arrangements, 
not aiming for a revolution because habits are hard to break, but 
progressive change over several generations (1993: 148): ‘who can tell, 
how many generations may be necessary to give vigour to the virtue and 
talents of the freed posterity of abject slaves?’29 
Bilkent University 
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29 Many thanks to two referees for Philosophical Papers for their helpful comments.  
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